

Translation from Polish by Barbara (Korwin-Kamieńska) Herchenreder
Translator's notes, if any, in italics

The document is clearly a draft version, with handwritten comments mostly regarding presentation of the report (spacing, layout etc.). These are not reproduced in the translation. There are also a few handwritten additions/amendments to the text, and these have been added in bold italics where relevant.

Handwriting in top left corner, partially obscured and illegible:

1st Independent Parachute Brigade

Defence Intelligence Officer

Daily order no.: ???

???? ... 44

1st INDEPENDENT PARACHUTE BRIGADE DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE¹
in operation "MARKET"

General outline of the work of Defence Intelligence in military operations:

It is essential to differentiate between three basic phases in operational stages of Defence Intelligence:

- Planning the operation
- The operation itself
- Consolidation period

During each of these phases, the foremost task is to foil enemy intelligence. During the planning phase these activities are of a preventive nature, and offensive in both of the remaining phases. *Some[?]* Defence Intelligence tasks, such as countering diversion, propaganda and sabotage are left to a later stage.

A. OPERATION PLANNING STAGE

I. General

The work of Defence Intelligence in this period is entirely devoted to securing the element of surprise, which is one of the most important aspects of airborne [parachute] activities. On the question of whether, and to what degree, an element of surprise has been achieved depends not just the sacrifice in terms of human life and blood but the actual success of the operation.

The importance of the element of surprise arises out of the following provisions:

- a) sensitivity of the airborne troops to enemy attack during the period of massing and of the flight itself,
- b) vulnerability of airborne troops during landing,

¹ *In Brit. English referred to as Military Intelligence, in some other Allied forces as Defence Intelligence.*

- c) a certain limitation of the equipment of airborne troops in preparation for very intensive but brief combat of a distinctly harassing nature.

The difficulties pertaining to achievement of surprise are based on the following:

- the fact that parachute action must be prepared with great care, which involves lengthiness of preparation, varied locations and terrain where such preparations are carried out (units, staff, airfields), large numbers of personnel who need to be acquainted with the operation (airborne troops, flyers, glider pilots, airfield personnel etc.),
- and the fact that there is a wide range of activities which cannot be concealed from external observation (collection of parachutes, preparation of pods and gliders, transport to the airfield).

It is, therefore, necessary to come to terms with the fact that it is absolutely impossible to provide conditions which would guarantee complete certainty that the secrecy of the operation has been 100% safeguarded.

Nonetheless, it is imperative that secrecy should be safeguarded to such a degree in relation to:

- the timing of the operation and
- the place of the operation.

Information which the enemy might be able to obtain concerning preparation for an airborne operation or even about participation in it of particular air-force units is not, in itself, a greater threat to the operation – apart from alerting and setting in motion the enemy's intelligence machine – since, as yet, the enemy lacks those elements which would allow him to successfully counter such an operation. On the other hand, to reveal the time and place of an operation – and hence, indirectly, the route of the airborne transport – will allow the enemy to take the following counter action:

- bombing the massing and loading area,
- organising back-up for fighter aircraft on the flight path,
- ensuring reinforcement of ground-based anti-aircraft equipment on the flight path, using mechanised anti-aircraft systems (vehicles, railway wagons, barges, boats etc.)
- reinforcing the landing area and objects of the attack with army units and firepower,
- organising the defence of these objects in order to prevent them from being captured by parachute troops which are not usually equipped with heavy armament.

It is, therefore, imperative to take all necessary precautions to prevent information leaking out and, above all, to try and eliminate the gossip which is so prevalent in all armies.

The means of eradicating this will consist of:

- a) relevant education of troops, making them aware of Military Secret Security². This requires long-term action and very thorough preparation. The point of this is not just to make the soldier aware of the means, methods and capabilities of which the enemy makes use but, above all, to ensure that he understands:
- that Military Secret Security is not just a new bureaucratic concept aimed at making his life more difficult but that its purpose is the very protection of life – both his own and that of his comrades,
 - that Military Secret Security guarantees less spillage of human blood and less stressful experiences at a moment when the soldier, himself, is defenceless, is not able to fight, and when he must calmly and – most importantly – inactively accept whatever the

² Polish OTW (*Ochrona Tajemnicy Wojskowej*)

enemy may subject him to, that, to a great degree, the success of an operation depends on Military Secret Security,

- that the functionaries of Defence Intelligence are not some sort of ‘snoops’ but friends who act in defence of your livelihood and for your wellbeing,
- that, finally, the soldier himself, and his conscience, is responsible for keeping secrets and that carelessly spoken words may result in needlessly wasting the life of a comrade.

This task requires a great deal of time but does bring good results although ideal secrecy can never be achieved – and this applies not only to the lower ranks but to commanders, as well.

- b) Control measures applied by Defence Intelligence aimed at ascertaining whether regulations concerning leakage of information are, in fact, being adhered to. This control will be carried out by ensuring that censorship of post is thorough and effective, that all directives issued by the commanding officer in matters of Military Secret Security are being carried out not only with precision but, indeed, with reasonable over-emphasis. During this time, Defence Intelligence authorities should saturate the area with its informers – above all, those places which are particularly susceptible to the leakage of secrets in the presence of enemy agents (canteens, bars, dance halls etc.) so as to be aware of any breaches of secret information and to instigate relevant counter-measures, starting with carrying out investigations and ending with recommendations to cancel the operation.
- c) Special preventive measures, ensuring that details of the operation are only available to those who need them in order to carry out their duties, while ensuring that only information which is essential to those specific duties is provided. Provision of such information must take place in a time-frame which is barely sufficient for the carrying out of the specific duties.

A plan must, therefore, be prepared for the Commanding Officer which will specify the time-frame, amount and quality of the specific information which is to be revealed. In practice, this means that ‘x’ weeks or days before an operation, only the Commanding Officer, Head of Staff, the Operational Officer and Intelligence Officer – and nobody else – will know about the entire operation. Only these persons are to be involved in preparation of the plan.

Next, the operation is revealed, in turn, to:

- Battalion commanders and their first adjutants, as well as other members of the Brigade’s Staff Command.
- Squadron commanders,
- Platoon commanders.

Finally, a few days before the start of the operation, a general briefing takes place for all airborne troops. From a diagrammatic point of view, with time, an increasing number of people are informed about the details of the operation. However, going down the ladder of military hierarchy, the amount and quality of information is increasingly smaller, or even less important. The time and place must be kept secret, to a sensible degree of course, right down to the last possible moment. (Timing referred to by codeword “D-Day”, issuing sketches and constructing tactical sandtables – so-called ‘blind’ or classified versions without names but with coded signposting of characteristic features.)

- d) Preparation of operations room, with the clear cut condition that all documents connected with the operation (orders, maps, aerial photographs, sand-tables etc.) can be accepted and held solely in these premises. Until the moment stipulated in the operational plan, absolutely no-one at all has the right to take anything out of the operations room. Every

single operational activity must take place solely in the operations room. These premises must be carefully guarded from outside and inside, preventing any unauthorised persons from entering or having access to it. Internal monitoring should be carried out by the Defence Intelligence Team. Special passes must be issued to individual persons as, and when, their involvement is envisaged by the plan. Even persons authorised to enter the operations room should only be able to familiarise themselves with the operation to the extent to which the plan envisages. Use of the telephone to discuss matters even indirectly connected to the operation is prohibited. It is essential that all conversations are carried out in such a way as to ensure that their contents are only available to those people for whom they are meant.

Support personnel must be employed for the operations room (clerks, graphic artists, cleaners etc.). This personnel is appointed by the Commanding Officer on the recommendation of the Defence Intelligence Officer. As a rule, this personnel should be isolated and not allowed to leave the operations room until such time as general familiarisation with the operation takes place. Effort must be made to organise more or less similar conditions at lower levels of command, too. No effort is too great to ensure that the operations room is isolated to the highest humanly possible degree.

- e) General familiarisation should take place in a time limit which is essential to familiarise troops with the operation. From the moment the classified information is released it is mandatory that all troops be isolated. This takes place in a so-called 'Transit Camp', which no-one is allowed to leave and even soldiers transferred from the Transit Camp to hospitals are transported along a special route and to special hospitals where security conditions in line with Military Secrets Security are maintained.
- f) The winding down of preparations for the operation must ensure that, even after the departure of the flight, classified information concerning the operation is not revealed. This includes the period of time up to the official announcement of the commencement of the operation. A member of the Defence Intelligence personnel should be appointed for this.

II. PREPARATIONS FOR PARACHUTE BRIGADE OPERATION

1. Time

Preparation time for the operation lasted from 5th August 1944 to 21st September 1944. During this period the following operations were being planned:

- a) TRANSFIGURE (RAMBOUILLET)
- b) LINNET (***RENAIX***)
- c) ***COMET*** (GRAVE)
- d) MARKET (ARNHEM)

Of these, only the last operation was successful.

2. Parachute Brigade Defence Intelligence hierarchy:

Brigade Staff Command

Capt. KARPIŃSKI, Stanisław – Brigade Defence Intelligence Officer
Sgt. JANICKI, Stefan – Clerk to Brigade Defence Intelligence Officer

Defence Intelligence Team

Lieut. BRZEG, Władysław – Commander

1. Sgt.Mjr. KOSMALSKI, Zbigniew – Head
2. Sgt. JUSZCZAK, Marian
3. Sgt. KONIUSZEWSKI, Czesław
4. Sgt. ZAREMBA, Franciszek
5. Platoon Cadet Officer ZŁOTNICKI, Stanisław
6. Platoon Leader NAHORSKI, Michał
7. Platoon Leader STRYJECKI, Jan
8. Corp. SPAŁA, Apolinary
9. Corp. SZCZĘSNY, Stefan
10. Pte. WŁOCZKOWSKI, Jerzy – Driver

All private soldiers belonging to the Defence Intelligence Team have undergone a 2-week training course in the Intelligence School in Matlock (O.R.'s Security Course) – (Platoon Cadet Officer Złotnicki awarded 1st place) – and a 2-month Defence Intelligence course in the Parachute Brigade, run in ELIE³ during the period from 10th December 1943 to 15th February 1944 by Capt. Stanisław KARPIŃSKI, and Lieut. Zygmunt KRASIŃSKI.

The above composition of members of the Defence Intelligence Team had only two permanent official posts (that of the Brigade Defence Intelligence Officer and his Clerk) – the remainder did not have official posts.

The list shows the composition of the Defence Intelligence Team as it stood during the period of Operation MARKET. Previously, during earlier preparations, the Defence Intelligence Team included:

Lieut. KRASIŃSKI, Zygmunt – Commander Defence Intelligence Team
 Lieut. DUZEL, Mieczysław – Defence Intelligence Officer I Parachute Battalion
 Lieut. BRZEG, Władysław – Defence Intelligence Officer II Parachute Battalion
 2nd Lieut. MATLAK, Kazimierz – Defence Intelligence Officer III Parachute Battalion
 2nd Lieut. FIJALSKI, Kazimierz – Defence Intelligence Officer – non battalion units.

With the exception of 2nd Lieut. FIJALSKI, Stanisław, who was also head of the Parachute Brigade's postal service, all these officers held only Defence Intelligence positions.

In view of the necessity of adapting the Brigade's Defence Intelligence organisational networks to that of the 1st Airborne Division's Intelligence, to which the Brigade was operationally subject, as of 25th August 1944 the positions of Defence Intelligence officers in the Battalions were discarded and in their place, the Commanders assigned officers who, on their behalf and independently of their official posts, were responsible for protection of classified information and adherence to the principles of Military Secrets Security.

The list of these officers, is as follows:

Lt. TALAŚKA, Jan	I Para. Battalion (Adjutant)
Lt. BROSZKIEWICZ, Tadeusz	II " " "
2nd Lt. BEREDA, Jerzy	III " " (Intelligence Officer)
2nd Lt. KRAJEWSKI, Edmund	Sappers Company
2nd Lt. WILK, Jan	Signals "
2nd Lt. (MO) BURACZEWSKI, Janusz	Medical Corps
Lt. KACZMAREK, Stefan	Supplies Company
2nd Lt. SYKORA, Ottokar	Para. Artillery Battery

³ *Elie in Scotland*

2nd Lt. GRABOWSKI, Walenty
 Lt. KRASIŃSKI, Zygmunt
 2nd Lt. FIJALSKI, Stanisław

Anti-tank Artillery Battery
 Staff Unit
 Para. Brigade Command

3. Instructions:

There was a total lack of Defence Intelligence Instructions, adjusted to the requirements of Defence Intelligence organisational work in military operations. The central authorities issued nothing apart from Instruction 0/27 which was very generalised and did not provide concrete information concerning the status, role and tasks of the Brigade's Defence Intelligence in military operations.

The Parachute Brigade Defence Intelligence Officer prepared and – where necessary – translated, the following instructions for use by the Brigade's Defence Intelligence group:

- Parachute Brigade Internal Instructions for Defence Intelligence Heads, part I "Garrison Quarters". (Enclosure No. 1)
- Parachute Brigade Internal Instructions for Defence Intelligence Heads, part II "Defence Intelligence in Operations". (Encl. No. 2)
- 21st Army Group Security Instruction 21 (translation). (Encl. no. 3)
- France, as seen from the point of view of Defence Intelligence (Encl. No. 4)
- Proposed use of Defence Intelligence in the operation (Encl. No. 5)
- Instruction "~~Command building defence~~" "*Security - ?????*" (Encl. No. 6)
- *Security Instruction 6A/B Div* (Encl. No. 7)
- *21st Army Group Instruction re Civil Affairs* (Encl. No. 8)

4. Passes:

The following types of passes were introduced:

- To the Command Building (navy blue) (Encl. No. 11)
- To the Operations Building (red) (Encl. No. 12)
- To the Transit Camp (green) (Encl. No. 13)

The pass was designed to be simple, bearing in mind that such a pass should be:

- Easy to distinguish
- Enable identification of the holder
- Not contain details which, in themselves, would reveal confidential information
- In case of loss of the pass would prevent it being used improperly (hence the lack of information pointing to its authorised use – this aspect was reflected by the colour of the pass).

5. Operations Building:

The "WOTHORPE" building in the town of STAMFORD was assigned solely for this purpose.

The equipment and security of this building results from the following annexed documents:

- Proposed location of operations building (Encl. No. **14**)
- Sentry duty instructions (Encl. No. **15**)
- Instructions for staff within the building (Encl. No. **16**)
- Operations Building Regulations (Encl. No. **17**)
- *Inst[ructions] for security post???* in HQ (*1st Ind[ependent] Para[chute] Br[igade]*) (Encl. No. **18**)

External sentry duty was carried out by the Staff Defence Platoon, internal by the Defence Intelligence Team.

Handwritten: *21st Army Group Periodical Security Notes No. 6 (Encl. No. 9) Defence Intelligence regulations for personnel of HQ office of 1st Ind. Para. Brig. (Encl. No. 10)*

6. Division of Defence Intelligence bodies for operation purposes

The Parachute Brigade set out on the operation, divided into the following drops:

[I Sea drop _____ on 15th August 1944
 -Glider drop _____ on 19th September 1944
 -Parachute drop _____ on 21st September 1944
 II Sea drop _____ on 24th September 1944]

Consequently, the heads of Defence Intelligence were divided as follows:

a) I SEABORNE DROP:

- 1) Platoon Cadet Officer ZŁOTNICKI, Stanisław
- 2) Pte. WŁOCZKOWSKI, Jerzy

b) GLIDER DROP:

- 1) Sgt. JUSZCZAK, Marian, with the proviso that 2nd Lieut. GRABOWSKI, Walenty had overall supervision of the works of Defence Intelligence's glider drops.

c) PARACHUTE DROP:

- 1) Capt. KARPIŃSKI Stanisław
- 2) Lieut. BRZEG, Władysław
- 3) Sgt.Mjr. KOSMAŁSKI, Zbigniew
- 4) Sgt. KONIUSZEWSKI, Czesław
- 5) Sgt. ZAREMBA, Franciszek
- 6) Platoon Cadet Officer NAHORECKI, Michał
- 7) Platoon Cadet Officer STRYJECKI, Jan
- 8) Corp. SPAŁA, Apolinary
- 9) Corp. SZCZĘSNY, Stefan

Aircraft allocation was as follows:

Aircraft No. 92:

Capt. KARPIŃSKI
 Sgt.Mjr. KOSMAŁSKI
 Corp. SZCZĘSNY

Aircraft No. 93:

Sgt. KONIUSZEWSKI

Sgt. ZAREMBA
Corp. SPAŁA

Aircraft No. 101:

Lieut. BRZEG
Pl. Ldr. NAHORECKI
Pl. Ldr. STRYJECKI

d) II SEABORNE DROP:

1) Sgt. JANICKI, Stefan, in charge of safeguarding of Military Secrets Security in the operations room on the departure of the Brigade for its operation.

7. Post

a) In General:

Correspondence constitutes a considerable danger for Military Secrets Security, when the sending of correspondence is not organised and troops are able to send their correspondence without any control.

The most successful method of preventing troops from using postal services outside the jurisdiction of their unit, or of taking advantage of chance opportunities to pass on their post, is to ensure that the unit's own postal service is sufficiently efficient and fast to ensure the troops' confidence in it.

b) Organisation of the Parachute Brigade's Postal Services

Prior to the operation and for the purposes of the operation, the Brigade Commander ordered the re-organisation of the Parachute Brigade's postal service which until then had been run centrally by the Brigade. 2nd Lieut. Stanisław FIJALSKI – an officer of Defence Intelligence, non-Battalion units and Deputy to the Brigade Intelligence Officer – was appointed Head of the Postal Service.

The Post Service was de-centralised so that during the period prior to postal censorship each unit could send and receive its own post.

The following postal services were set up:

Parachute Brigade Command	- P/76
I Parachute Battalion	- P/85
II " "	- P/86
III " "	- P/87
Parachute Engineers' Company	- P/88
Field Ambulance Company	- P/89
Signals Company	- P/83
Supplies Company	- P/81
Parachute Artillery Battery	- P/60
Anti-tank Artillery Battery	- P/61
Parachute Transport and Supply Company	- P/100

Individual heads of postal services underwent training by Polish Field Post No. 1 in EDINBURGH.

c) Postal Censorship

The moment the Brigade was put on operation alert, postal censorship was introduced in accordance with principles defined for this purpose in the Instructions (Encl. No. 19)

At the same time, liaising with the British authorities, censorship of telephone conversations and telegraph correspondence was introduced.

d) Assessment

Practice proved that the Postal Service worked very efficiently, despite the enormous amount of work and difficult field conditions. During the period of the operation, the Brigade received some 60,000 letters.

Apart from minor exceptions, it was not found that troops by-passed unit postal services or that military secrets leaked out through correspondence.

8. Briefings and discussions

Throughout the preparation time for the operation a great deal of time was spent on talking to the troops and reminding them yet again of how important military secrets were and warning them of the consequences of leakage of information. These talks were illustrated with examples taken from real life wartime situations and discussion was invited. There was a good deal of interest, particularly as the troops were well aware of the necessity of keeping military classified information secret as it affected each one of them directly.

To start with, the talks were run by Defence Intelligence Officers, and then by the Brigade Defence Intelligence Officer.

During the period prior to the operation and during the operation itself not a single incident was noted which seriously breached military secrets, although the soldiers had a tendency towards making it clear to their environment that they were going into action, notably – among others – soldiers would show people the French, Belgian or Dutch money which had previously been issued to them and this could have been a signal to others of the direction of their action. As a result, soldiers were issued with all sorts of foreign currency but French currency was taken back just before the start of the operation. Another example of such minor but quite frequent ways of informing the public at large was the fact that soldiers were not able to stop themselves making statements such as: “I must say goodbye because I’ll not see you tomorrow”, or “I can’t make a date for the pictures because I don’t know what will happen tomorrow”, etc. etc. These resulted in public gossip spreading that the Poles “are going into action, flying tomorrow”.

As the operation was constantly being postponed and there were many such “tomorrows”, the public became disorientated and stopped treating this type of farewell seriously.

9. Communications/Signals Officers

Depending on the terrain of the anticipated operation, French and Belgian officers were assigned to help with communications with the civilian population and with the Underground in those parts which were occupied [by the enemy]; Polish officers from S.A.S. (Special Allied Service) units were assigned to liaise with the Polish Underground working in French territory. On the command of the Brigade Commander, these officers were assigned to the Brigade’s Defence Intelligence. The above officers were:

a) Operation TRANSFIGURE

- French Army Captain BOVERAT, Raymond
- French Army, 2nd Lieutenant PHILIP Olivier

b) Operation LINNET

- Belgian Army 2nd Lieutenant Joseph van den EYCKEN
- Polish Army, Captain ***Dolega-JASIŃSKI***
- Polish Army Lieutenant ***Kijewski, Janusz***

c) Operation COMET and MARKET

A Dutch officer who, once in operation territory, was to report but this never came about.

10. Defence Intelligence and the I SEABORNE DROP

The I Seaborne Drop left the Brigade on the night of 14th to 15th August 1944.

On the way to France Platoon Cadet Officer Stanisław ZŁOTNICKI held discussions on the ship on the subject of Classified Military Secrets.

Having arrived on the Continent, the I Seaborne Drop initially found itself in territory occupied by the Americans.

Platoon Cadet Officer ZŁOTNICKI made contact with the following:

- a) American C.I.C. [Counter Intelligence Corps] in LITRY⁴ H.Q. ASGZ.G-2
Sec.Cic.Det. Team G.
- b) F.S.P. [Field Security Police] 1st Airborne Division (Rear)
- c) F.S.O. [Field Security Operations] Canadian Division.

He also reported to the Head of Defence Intelligence of the British Corps (I-b)

Platoon Cadet Officer ZŁOTNICKI'S cooperation with British Security and with the American C.I.C. ran smoothly and was very thorough. At the request of the Head of British Defence Intelligence Corps, for example, Platoon Cadet Officer ZŁOTNICKI held talks for the French Police, familiarising the French with the regulations of the 21st Army Group in the matter of safety and order.

The American C.I.C. applied to the Commander of the Ist Seaborne Drop, asking that he "lend" them Platoon Cadet Officer ZŁOTNICKI as they wanted to take advantage of his very good knowledge of the French language, as the C.I.C.'s liaison with the COMMISSAIRE DU SERVICE CONTRE-ESPIONAGE⁵ in BAYEUX.

As a result of the cooperation with C.I.C., the Commander of the I Seaborne Drop received official thanks from the C.I.C. for Platoon Cadet Officer Stanisław ZŁOTNICKI'S personal cooperation (Encl. No. 20).

On 13th September 1944, Platoon Cadet Officer Stanisław ZŁOTNICKI was killed in a motoring accident in Brussels.

11. Defence Intelligence and the II Seaborne Drop

The II SEABORNE DROP LEFT THE Brigade's quarters during the night of 23rd to 24th September 1944. Having closed down the operations building, Sgt. Stefan JANICKI handed the

⁴ *Le Molay-Littry? Normandy, west of Caen and near Bayeux*

⁵ *Head of Counter-Espionage Services*

keys over to WSW⁶ Major Eugeniusz STOLARSKI, Commander of the remainder of the Brigade.

It was not possible to develop the Defence Intelligence of the II Seaborne Drop as the Parachute Brigade was recalled to Great Britain and returned from France to the Brigade's base on 10th October 1944.

12. Defence Intelligence and the GLIDER DROP

No information is available as Sergeant Marian JUSZCZAK was lost in action at ARNHEM. According to some sources, he was wounded and taken prisoner-of-war by the Germans.

B. THE OPERATION

I. GENERAL

On the basis of both our own and British parachute operation experiences, it must be said that conditions during the actual course of battle preclude the possibility of Defence Intelligence work. Combat wipes off the face of the earth all other signs of life except that of the battle itself. Whatever the tasks envisaged for Defence Intelligence operatives, once they find themselves involved in combat they become an element of such combat and will have to take part in it. Their role will be no different or more important than that of any ordinary soldier in battle. This eventuality must be taken into account when planning an operation and it is necessary to foresee that many of the important activities which would normally be carried out by Defence Intelligence operatives will have to be carried out by the individual units themselves and using their own resources. And that is why all commanders must be informed in advance of the type of events with which they may be faced and how they should react to them.

The main concern of Defence Intelligence should be to ensure that one's own field of activity is secured against any possibility of infiltration – either to or from the enemy. Lack of regulations covering this aspect carries with it the danger that there might be intelligence agents or even enemy saboteurs among the relaxed civilian population. In battle conditions there is not enough time or possibility of carrying out any sort of verification of the civilian population and, therefore, the only potential and appropriate solution is to prohibit all movement by the civilian population. The rule must be “STAY WHERE YOU ARE” and units should use any available means to enforce this directive among the civilian population. This is no easy matter, bearing in mind people's natural tendency to flee from areas of combat. This task, however, must be carried out as only this solution can guarantee that an enemy agent will not be able to penetrate our field of action without being noticed, and that agents previously sent into the area and either intentionally or by accident left in it will be unable to carry any information back to the enemy.

Commanders should also be provided with information as to what they should do with suspicious persons, how to stop them (search for weapons, confiscate all papers, documents and other items), how to detain them (keep them away from prisoners-of-war) and also where and when to transfer them.

⁶ WSW [*Wojskowa Służba Wewnętrzna = Military Counter-intelligence and Military Police Service*]

Isolation of the area of operation and treatment of suspicious persons are the two most essential matters which have to be dealt with even in the course of on-going combat; they can only be dealt with by the units on whose territory such events occurred.

Once the period of actual combat, or its intensification, passes then conditions once again become suitable for work by Defence Intelligence operatives.

These tasks will then involve the following:

- Making contact with own agents or sympathisers (WHITE list)
- Deactivate/neutralise enemy agents or suspected persons (BLACK list). The Defence Intelligence Officer receives both these lists as an annexe to Operational Orders.
- Searching premises used by the enemy for documents which, from the point of view of Counter-intelligence or of Counter-espionage (in this matter it is necessary to work in conjunction with the Intelligence Officer).
- Making any contact whatsoever with the enemy impossible by eliminating all possible methods of communication (radio, telephone, pigeon post etc.).
- Preparing a plan to safeguard all major equipment [installations] which are of special importance to the army or the operation, against sabotage.

II. The Parachute Brigade's Defence Intelligence during phase I of the ARNHEM-DRIEL operation

During the first phase of the ARNHEM-DRIEL operation, the Parachute Brigade's Defence Intelligence found itself in very difficult conditions. It went straight into battle from the very beginning of the operation. One of the soldiers of the Defence Intelligence team (Platoon Leader Michał NAHORECKI – wounded) had to start combat by throwing a hand grenade before he even reached the ground because he saw that he was landing directly onto a German defence position. The populace, initially taken by surprise by the landing and the battle, came out into the streets of the town of DRIEL, as soon as the action quietened down. Conditions made it impossible to put in motion the principle of "STAY WHERE YOU ARE".

Once battle is joined and firing breaks out, an incredibly difficult task emerges – that of countering the spontaneous flight of civilians who are intent on leaving the battleground at all costs. Draconian methods are required but the attitude of the civilian populace towards us and the fact that this was an allied nation made this impossible.

Nonetheless, it has to be stressed that no fact was noted which might indicate that, because the area had not been made impenetrable, the actions of the enemy had, in one way or another been successful, or had caused some sort of damage to the Brigade or the operation itself.

The part played by Defence Intelligence operatives in the 1st phase of the Battle of ARNHEM-DRIEL

The following members of the Parachute Brigade's Defence Intelligence were involved in this period of the operation:

- | | |
|-----------------|-------------------|
| 1) Lieut. | BRZEG, Władysław |
| 2) Platoon Ldr. | NAHORECKI, Michał |
| 3) " " | STRYJECKI, Jan |

- | | | |
|----------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| 4) Sgt. | KONIUSZEWSKI, Czesław | }nos. 4, 5 and 6 |
| 5) " | ZAREMBA, Franciszek) | }not until |
| 6) Corp. | SPAŁA, Apolinary) | }23rd September 1944 |

Aircraft No. 92, carrying Capt. KARPIŃSKI, Stanisław
Sgt. Mjr. KOSMALSKI, Zbigniew and
Corp. SZCZĘSNY, Stefan

was shot down on 21st September 1944 over Holland by enemy anti-aircraft fire. All members of Defence Intelligence baled out and landed in terrain which had already been cleared of the enemy. They joined the Brigade on 27th [?]⁷ September 1944. (Encl. No. 21)

Aircraft No. 93 (with Sgt. Koniuszewski, Czesław, Sgt. ZAREMBA, Franciszek and Corp. SPAŁA, Apolinary) was one of the aircraft which, during its flight on 21st September 1944, received orders that the operation was called off due to bad conditions and was recalled to an airfield in Great Britain. This aircraft set off again for the operation on 23rd September 1944.

C. CONSOLIDATION PERIOD

1. In General

1. Defence Intelligence Task

The period of consolidation commences as soon as the FRONT and REAR demarcation begins to form – i.e. combat zone and return to normal life. The task of Defence Intelligence then depends on channelling essential aspects of everyday life so that they do not pose a threat to the army, the battleground and the operation.

For this reason a plan of action for Defence Intelligence operatives has to be prepared during the initial period of preparation for the operation, and it must be based on a knowledge of the conditions prevailing in the field of the operation.

2. Description of the field of operation and local conditions

The Parachute Brigade's field of operations and the conditions prevailing there were – *according to information*⁸ – as follows:

- a) The Field of Operation was located in the province of GELDERLAND on the lower Rhine and in the northern reaches of the NORD BRABANT province, bordering from the east on the Rhineland. This territory belonged to the third occupational sector and was presided over by the normal system of the German 'Kommandantur'. The field of operations included the towns of ARNHEM (94000), NIJMEGEN (98000) and RAVENSTEIN (approx. 10000).
- b) The population did not represent any specific ethnic community and, in general, showed considerable likeness – from the point of view of language and character – to the Germans of the Rhineland. It was characterised by its composure and the fact that it did not easily give

⁷ The typed figure has been obscured – possibly 25th and corrected by hand with what appears to be the figure 7. The 27th September is the date recorded SLK's diary when he rejoined the Brigade.

⁸ Handwritten insertion – not very clear

way to emotions. 99% of the population remained loyal to the Dutch government. Sentiments were generally pro-British.

- c) Political life was mostly represented by the Catholic Party before the war. 90% of the population was Catholic. A Dutch Nazi Party (N.S.B. NATIONAL SOZIALISTISCH BEWEGING) already existed before the war, and in the province of Gelderland it held two mandates out of a total of 62 mandates.
- d) Before the war, the Dutch Administration was based on elected local governments, headed by a Mayor. The influence of the Mayor on all aspects of public life was considerable. The Mayors were generally respected and held in high esteem. The Germans abolished the elections. Under the occupation local governments and mayors were appointed by Reichskommissar SEYSS-INQUART – from among German sympathisers, of course.
- e) The Dutch Police – before the war – consisted of:
- The RIJKSVELDWACHT – a Local Government Police force (Law and Order),
subject to the Mayor, and
- The MARE CHAUSSEE – the State Police force, subject to the government, and
being something between a Police force and a Gendarmerie, or
Military Police.
- The Germans brought in their own Police, Military Police and Security Services (SICHERHEITZ POLIZEI, GESTAPO and SICHERHEITSDIENST), as well as the so-called ‘green police’, or border force. They tried to subjugate the Dutch police by seizing central control over it and thus depriving the Mayors of their authority over the police force. Despite this, the Germans did not entirely trust the Dutch Police which was authorised solely to the upkeep of law and order, and only some of the policemen were equipped with small arms.
- f) The Dutch Underground Movement – as a result of the tight controls and repressions carried out by the Germans – did not evolve on a greater scale. According to our information, the movement had no more than 6,000 members throughout the entire territory of Holland.

The main resistance organisations are as follows:

- RAAD van VERZET (R.V.V.), the most important organisation which had an influence on the activities of the remaining organisations; it was mostly composed of the intelligentsia and was armed. Its sabotage activities were mainly concentrated on the railways.
- KNOPLOEGEN (K.P. – Kpman) – approximately 550 members, armed. Task: carrying out assassination of Germans.
- LANDELIJKE unarmed; tasks: provision of identity documents and ration cards for members of the underground movement, and especially for all those persons hiding from deportation for hard labour in Germany. It is estimated that this organisation issued some 130,000 false identity documents, which did not differ from authentic documents in any way.
- ORDE DIENST (O.D.) unarmed, it represents a sort of new, rebuilt Dutch administration.

3. Approach to the Civilian Population

In accordance with 21st Army Group Security Instructions, for all matters relating to the civilian population, Army Command has a so-called CIVIL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT – at Corps level the CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION, and below that – in case of necessity and usually in the field – a CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER. This organisation works in strict contact with representatives of the Government of a given Allied nation, while Defence Intelligence is required to engage in close cooperation with C.A. [Civil Affairs] in all matters concerning the civilian population, and particularly with regard to the limitations which are to be placed upon those people, and in relation to refugees.

Even before the operation, the following recommendations were agreed between the Command of 21st Army Group and the relevant CA and Dutch authorities:

- The CA will bring with it a proclamation addressed to the populace, signed by Queen WILHELMINA, Prince BERNHADT as the Supreme Commander of Holland, and by Gen. EISENHOWER, calling for cooperation and support for the liberating armies.
- A similar appeal will be sent by radio from London.
- A radio broadcast will appeal to railway workers to start a general strike.
- Members of the UNDERGROUND will be identified by the relevant authorities and will be provided with relevant documents and orange coloured armbands with the word 'ORANJE' in black print.
- Workers, employed by the Allies, will be provided with blue-and-white armbands by the CA.
- Policemen, verified by the CA and appointed by the CA will be provided with white armbands with horizontal orange stripes and a black ink imprint with the letter "P".
- Policemen encountered in the first phase of action should be treated as follows: the older policemen are worthy of trust and they can be used to keep order, whilst the young ones, appointed by the Germans, are probably suspect and their services must not be used until they have been verified.

4. Preparatory tasks

During the preparatory period, prior to the operation, the Defence Intelligence Officer should prepare an Information Communiqué concerning COUNTERESPIONAGE, based on material provided to him. This Communiqué should contain all possible details relating to the territory, the authorities, the population and local sentiments, ensuring that every commander has a general awareness of these matters. In case of necessity, further instructions are added to this Communiqué, showing how to deal with certain matters and how to behave in specific conditions. This Communiqué is appended as an enclosure to the Operational Orders.

The Defence Intelligence Officer has prepared an Information Communiqué, as described above, for each of the operations being prepared by the Parachute Brigade.

(Encl. No. **22** Operation TRANSFIGURE
 Encl. No. **23** Operation LINNET
 Encl. No. **24** Operation COMET
 Encl. No. **25** Operation MARKET).

II. CONSOLIDATION OF THE PARACHUTE BRIGADE'S AREA OF OPERATION

1. Area

Following the withdrawal on *26th September 1944* of airborne troops from the ARNHEM-DRIEL region, the Parachute Brigade was assigned to the defence of an area bounded from the north by the River MAAS, and from other directions by the towns of RAVENSTEIN, HUISELING, HERPEN and OVERLANGEN. Defence of this area secured the large – and sole – airfield in the already liberated area of Holland, located near the town of OVERLANGEN. Within this area was the town of NEERLOON, where the Parachute Brigade's Command was located.

Next, the Brigade was charged with defence of the bridges on the MAAS-WAAL Canal, i.e. the road bridge at HEUMEN and the road and rail bridges to the south-west of the town of NIJMEGEN.

2. Time-frame

The time-frame of the work on the consolidation of the area was from 27th⁹ September to 7th October 1944, upon which date the Brigade was withdrawn from the front line.

3. Composition of Defence Intelligence

Capt. KARPIŃSKI, Lieut. BRZEG, Sgt. Maj. KOSMALSKI, Sgt. KONIUSZEWSKI, Sgt. ZAREMBA, Platoon Ldr. NAHORECKI, Platoon Ldr. STRYJECKI, Corp. SPAŁA, Corp. SZCZĘSNY, and when the I Seaborne Drop joined – Rifleman Jerzy WŁOCZKOWSKI.

4. Characteristics of the area, the population, and local sentiments

- a) Terrain. The entire area constituted a single administrative region, the centre of which was the town of RAVENSTEIN. RAVENSTEIN was both the headquarters of the administrative authorities, and of a range of public services.
- b) The military situation. From the west and the south was a so-called 'no man's land' with minor British reconnaissance features. German patrols belonging to the 712 Infantry Division would penetrate this area. The British 157th Brigade was to the east of the area. From the north, on the right bank of the River MAAS were British troops from the 30th Corps and the Dutch 'Prinses Irene' Brigade, which was charged with the defence of the bridge on the River MAAS, near the town of GRAVE.

The bridges on the canal at NIJMEGEN were in the Grenadier Guards field of operation.

The bridge at HEUMEN initially belonged to the American 82nd Airborne Division's field of operation and then to the British 3rd Division. The location of this bridge in relation to the front was such that, from time to time, it came under fire from German artillery.

- c) Population. The local population, the vast majority of whom are farmers, was almost totally of Dutch ~~origin~~ **nationality**, although one could find very many people of German origin or, in one way or another, connected with Germany (birth, work, family etc.).

The population is almost 100% Catholic.

Sentiments of the population to the Germans did not reveal any particular animosity.

This resulted from the fact that these people practically never saw the Germans since their

⁹ The typed figure has been obscured – possibly 25th or 26th and corrected by hand with what appears to be the number 7.

entire awareness of the occupation boiled down to providing food supplies to the occupiers. These supplies were accounted for as follows: every so often a German official from the 'Kommandatur' in Nijmegen would arrive (he was usually a Catholic), he would go to the Parish Priest and they would jointly work out a division of the provisions.

The standard of living of the population was high.

The population was not really aware of any lack of food items, although bread and potatoes were rationed. However, there was a lack of items such as: real coffee, tea, chocolate, soap, cigarettes and tobacco. Small children had never seen chocolate in their lifetime.

The attitude of the population to the government of Her Majesty Queen Wilhelmina was absolutely and unquestionably loyal.

It is difficult to describe the general attitude of the population to matters of liberation. There was no sign of any general enthusiasm for the liberation. Nonetheless, one could meet individuals who were very positively involved and worked devotedly for liberation. The majority, however, was unconcerned albeit generally in favour yet without accentuation of this approval. It is difficult to assess whether this reluctance came from the national characteristics of the population of this part of the Dutch borderlands, or whether it was the effect of a calculated approach to the, as yet, unstable war situation and to a fear that the Germans might still return. The latter supposition appears to be confirmed by the fact that, the further from the front line, the greater the enthusiasm for the liberation, with a greater number of Dutch and orange flags, and a greater number of hands raised with the "V" sign.

In relation to the Poles, the people were polite and positive but with an indifference such as that shown to the remainder of the Allied forces. It was not until the first Sunday spent in the area, with the churches full of Polish soldiers, that this attitude suddenly became friendly, and somehow warmer in its outward expression. Refusal to take payment for fruit, other examples of giving like-for-like, greeting the Polish soldiers in the Polish language, spontaneous promises to care for the graves of the Polish paratroopers buried there, were all outward expressions of this attitude. The relatively quick departure of the Brigade did not allow a final cementation of this attitude.

Conversations with the people very clearly revealed their anti-Communist standpoint.

- d) Dutch administrative authorities. The body in charge of the administration of the entire area was the Mayor of the town of RAVENSTEIN.

In 1940, the Germans appointed a new Mayor who was in favour of cooperation with the Germans but who fled on 13th September 1944, together with the occupiers.

Nobody took over the position of Mayor until 30th September 1944, the former 1940 Mayor having, until now, been in hiding from the Germans. *This was*¹⁰ Mr Godefridus Johannes van STEKELENBURG who took over office and began to rebuild the structures of the local administration.

- e) The Dutch Police. There remained in the area 4 policemen from the MARE CHAUSSEE, who had retained their functions throughout the occupation. These were:

Sgt. van den AKKER
 van der STAM – both from RAVENSTEIN
 van VALKENBURG
 and QUAX – the latter two from HERPEN

¹⁰ *Handwritten insertion into text.*

These policemen were not verified, as had been announced by the C.A. and they had not been provided with the special armbands.

According to the opinion of local people, these policemen were loyal to the Germans but limited themselves entirely to matters of order and safety, while their attitude to the population was irreproachable.

The attitude of these policemen to the Allied forces continued to be irreproachable and faultless. They were good and disciplined functionaries who carried out the orders they were given.

- f) Underground and Orde Dienst. The Underground was in deep crisis. According to information revealed by members of the K.P. and B.V.V., the crisis resulted from the following: the members of these organisations had maintained their intransigent attitude towards the occupiers. They fought, carried out assassinations, were arrested, hanged or shot, sent to concentration camps etc. At the moment of liberation, the Dutch government apparently acknowledged these individuals as dangerous, as they were ostensibly entrenched Communists. The Government did, however, recognise and grant privileged status to the O.D. organisation whose members during the occupation seemingly collaborated with the Germans – at any rate, they were obedient to them and worked without taking any major risks. At the moment of liberation this situation worsened as hundreds of people turned to the O.D., in the hope of making a career but their attitude to the occupier was neutral and sometimes even friendly. In order to achieve legitimisation and receive an O.D. armband, all that was needed, for instance, was to apply to the Police in NIJMEGEN and offer one's services in maintenance of law and order. The police only checked the identity of such persons but not their past and their attitude towards the occupiers.

All other *resistance* organisations who fought in the underground were subordinated to the O.D. This led to a strong feeling of bitterness and in their disappointment people refused to cooperate with the O.D., stating that it is beneath their honour as soldiers to be subordinated to those whom they previously had sought out and fought against during the occupation.

This conflict was made all the more difficult as the O.D., on its part, emphasised and took advantage of its privileged status.

- g) C.A. – F.S.P. – C.I.C. In the operations area, the C.A. was organised as follows:

S.C.A.D.¹¹ at HQ Air Troops – British Colonel THORNE-THORNE
NIJMEGEN – operation territory – area to the north of the River
WAAL.

S.C.A.D.¹² at HQ 30th Corps – British Colonel LAMBERT in
WIJCHEN – operation territory 30th British Corps

C.A. Off[icer] for town of OSS region – Brit. Major SAMUELSON
– Dutch. Major HOLTKAMPF

C.A. Off[icer] for town of GRAVE region – Brit. Mjr. CRIGHTON

Independently of the C.A., within the field of operations there was also a Representative Mission of the Government of H.M. Queen WILHELMINA which acted as a sort of

¹¹ *Handwritten in the margin, to replace S.C.A.S. in the text.*

¹² *As 9 above.*

supervisory body charged with looking after the interests of the civilian population. The representative for the area of the British 30th Corps was Baron de van der SCHUEREN.

The Brigade's field of operations had its own Defence Intelligence which was in administrative contact with the following operatives of British Security, the American C.I.C., and the Dutch Defence Intelligence:

- Defence Intelligence Officer, HQ Airtroops – Lieut. BRYDON
- F.S.O. – Grenadier Guards – [Handwritten] *Capt. YOUNG*
- F.S.O. – 30th British Corps – [Handwritten] *Capt. EXCELL*
all in the town of NIJMEGEN
- F.S.O. 3rd British Division – [Handwritten] *Capt. JACKSON*
in the town of HEUMEN

- I.O. British 157th Brigade – Capt. BROOK
in the town of REEK
- C.I.C. American 82nd Airborne Division (changeable contact)
- U.S.O. and N.L.O.
Royal Netherland Brigade
“PRINSES IRENE” – Lieut. H. J. SLAGTER
in the town of GRAVE

5. Conditions prevailing in the Parachute Brigade's field of operations at the time the Brigade took it over.

These conditions *were characterised by the following circumstances:*

- a) A total lack of structured administrative authorities
- b) A small and, additionally, unverified number of police functionaries
- c) An embittered Underground and the K.P. and R.V.V. organisations¹³
- d) The expansion, as previously described, of the O.D. organisation.
- e) In the area there is a considerable number of young people armed with German, British and American rifles. They either do not possess any identity documents or, if they do, then they have not been verified; they wear a variety of armbands, frequently just rags which, in addition, are not recognised by anyone, as they come from various parts of Holland. Nobody led these groups – they were mostly individual persons, claiming to belong to the Dutch Underground.
- f) Large numbers of refugees from areas of direct action or of bombing (mostly NIJMEGEN and ELST, and from the direction of the Reich, from the towns of MOOK and GROESBEEK). These refugees either did not have any identification at all (excuse being “I fled as I stood”, or “they were lost when the house was bombed”), or they had 2 or 3 identity documents made out in different names (resulting from the issue by the LANDELIJKE organisation of 130,000 false identity documents). The manner of identification of individual persons is best described by the fact that for every 4 persons detained on 29th September 1944 in the vicinity of the OVERLANGEN airfield, only one had a single identity document, the others had two each. An additional difficulty which was encountered was the difficulty in communicating with these people, as they often

¹³ *It is not clear from the phrasing whether the Underground was embittered by these organisations, or whether they, too, were embittered – translator's note.*

spoke in Dutch dialects which no familiarity with English or German – usually adequate in understanding a Dutchman – was of any use.

- g) A considerable number of both British and Dutch authorities and offices without a clear delineation of competency so that everyone dealt with everything and, in reality, one had the impression that nobody knew what to do and how to do it.
- h) Lack of a factor which would help to successfully and safely carry out a verification of the Underground, police and officials.
- i) A large number of mutual accusations amongst the civilian population concerning collaboration with the Germans.
- j) As a result of these circumstances, the security authorities were not able to control the situation and one could see people going here and there, at all times of the day and night, and without any checks. There was no question of any verification, either of the Underground, or the police, as had been envisaged by the Operational Orders. One had the impression that the current situation was beyond the wildest expectations and means of the security authorities.

6. The most important tasks of Defence Intelligence.

The circumstances described in point 5 could not be tolerated as they constituted a danger to the army, the field of operations and the operation itself. In the resultant chaos the enemy did not have far to look for suitable areas for the work of his intelligence agents or saboteurs.

On 27th September 1944, the Commander of the Parachute Brigade made the Defence Intelligence Officer responsible for the security of the area of the Parachute Brigade's activities and ordered that the following matters be tackled, with the possible additional help of the Brigade's Military Police:

- a) The matter of the Underground
- b) The movement of the population
- c) Refugees
- d) Defence of the bridges
- e) Suspected persons.

7. Tackling the matter of the Underground.

The question of carrying out verification of the underground was of primary concern, as a successful outcome would ensure that:

- a) Armed individuals of unknown origin, with whom nobody knew what to do and how to treat them (friend or foe), would disappear and
- b) Establishment of a group of helpers and co-workers in the department dealing with the maintenance of security, stability and order, which was absolutely essential as the Defence Intelligence strength, even reinforced by the Military Police, was in no way adequate for the needs and essentials of the situation.

The difficulty lay in:

- a) The lack of a body which would be able to carry out a verification, and
- b) In view of the discord between the Underground and the O.D., it was essential to seek the cooperation of the Underground, as it was the Underground which possessed a trusted,

ideological aspect, which had proved itself in battle, whilst the O.D. included very many opportunistic influences.

The Brigade's Defence Intelligence Officer made contact with all the heads of the C.A., Security and Dutch authorities, asking for help in dealing with the question of the Underground, the civilian population and refugees. Everywhere, he met with widespread understanding and agreement that the situation was, indeed, difficult and dangerous – but that's where the talk ended – nobody could give any concrete help. And, anyway, the situation was the same everywhere and with the same impasse of the security leadership. A stroke of luck lay in the fact that the Commander of the K.P. organisation for the GRAVE – HEESCH – OSS – MEGEN area was located in the defence area of the 1st Parachute Battalion.

This was a Mr Bernard Willem ARTS, Underground code-name HEIN de LEEUW (Lion). Direct contact with him revealed that he was an idealist, with a fighting spirit, able to unequivocally prove his membership of the Underground; he had an excellent knowledge of the territory and, even more important, knew the people and their attitude towards the occupier, and also had widespread contacts throughout Holland. Mr. ARTS was keen to cooperate but he, himself, suffered from a certain psychological breakdown as a result of the 'down-grading' of the Underground [organisation] and solely for this reason he had reservations concerning cooperation.

As a result of a conference with Mr. ARTS and his deputy, Mr. Franc van HAEREN, it was agreed that, without entering into any sort of decisions with the Dutch Government, the Underground – consisting of candidates put forward by Mr. ARTS – would form an armed organisation in the Parachute Brigade's field of operations and would be used for intelligence purposes, verification of specific people, defence of various facilities, and for special tasks. The matter of ensuring stability and order would be left to the O.D., together with control of the population.

Mr. ARTS presented a list of 37 people, ~~refugees~~ *members* of the K.P. organisation who had been verified and issued with identity documents and passes. From this moment, then, there were trusted civilians, were armed and whose presence in the area was authorised. (Enclosure No. 26) All other armed persons were detained, disarmed and sent to the Dutch mission in GRAVE. Within quite literally one day unknown and armed individuals disappeared from the area. As it later turned out, these were young men who were in hiding in the local forests to avoid being deported to Germany for hard labour. They had taken advantage of the confusion which resulted from the battles, equipped themselves with arms and began to ~~officiate~~ *act* as a sort of spontaneous Underground.

In RAVENSTEIN there was a O.D. recruitment centre. The head of this centre was Mr. H.P. van MOURIK, whose official title in English was "COMMANDER of the INTERIOR MILITARY FORCES of NETHERLANDS at RAVENSTEIN".

The recruitment process for the O.D. was underway and lately, just before the Parachute Brigade left the area, the number of members of the O.D. amounted to about ~~200~~ **150** people. These people were known and carefully selected. Mr. MOURIK himself was a member of the Underground, he was very keen, even quite enthusiastic about helping and cooperating; he was an active, energetic member and full of the best intentions. Mr. MOURIK was notified of the agreement with Mr. ARTS and was instructed that he, himself, as the head of the O.D. organisation was responsible for order and the safety of the civilian population, and that he was to have control over the people arriving in the area, control and care of refugees as well as control over the movements of the populace.

From then on the ARTS-MOURIK cooperation did not cause any problems, at all. Both the O.D. and the Underground carried out their duties zealously and in an exemplary fashion. At each request, we would receive the required number of O.D. helpers, whether as interpreters or as guards

at control points on roads and bridges, and also as security for groups of refugees, help with searches etc.

Mr. ARTS's organisation provided us with absolutely invaluable services, as a source of information for the verification of individual persons and also as a team of people penetrating deep (up to 20 km.) into enemy positions to gather intelligence. They brought back very precise, dependable and important information. A measure of the ideological stance of Mr. ARTS's people was the fact that, at the Air Troops I.O.'s request, it was proposed that a reconnaissance group be sent deep into Reich territory to the so-called the region of REICHSWALD – this proposition was accepted unconditionally and without a word of protest.

8. Control of population movement.

~~This control~~ related, above all, to the local populace and not the influx of peoples.

The aim was to marry the needs of security and the army, with the necessities of life of the people.

The difficulty lay in the fact that the forefront of the Brigade was a no-Man's land and that it was impossible to keep strict control of any person who ventured beyond the outer defence guardposts to ascertain whom he was contacting and why. It was not possible to completely shut off this traffic because of such necessities as:

- Visits to and from the medical officer, or veterinary surgeon to the town of OSS,
- Arrival of patients to see the doctor in RAVENSTEIN.
- Travel by farmers to fields which were beyond the guardpost perimeter,
- All types of special journeys, which were obviously important.

The matter of the movement of the populace was organised as follows:

- a) The Mayor of RAVENSTEIN announced a curfew, forbidding any traffic from 19:00 hours to 06:00 hours in the morning – anyone going out between these times risked being shot by guards and patrols.
- b) During the hours of allowable traffic, permanent residents could move around at will within the Parachute Brigade's area of defence.
- c) In case of urgent travel beyond this area both permanent residents, as well as transitory people, had to obtain a pass from Mr. van MOURIK (example as per Enclosure No. 27), who would judge whether there was a necessity for leaving the area and whether, or not, there were any reservations as to the applicant; next, the pass was signed by the Polish Garrison Commander, authorising crossing of the defence perimeter. Such travel could only take place during daytime.

9. Dealing with the question of refugees.

This matter had two aspects:

- a) A solution to the interests of ensuring the safety of the area, was not to allow masses of refugees into it, as it was easy to smuggle among them enemy intelligence agents or saboteurs, and
- b) the interests of public order would best be served by distributing the refugees along the entire narrow corridor of the already liberated parts of Holland because only this solution would provide a way out of the matter of quartering and feeding the refugees.

In concrete terms, this problem appeared as follows: the nearest centre for refugees in WIJCHEN was overloaded (up to 8,000 people) and new crowds of refugees were arriving all the time; the Brigade's area of operations could cope with a considerable number, the town of RAVENSTEIN itself offered to quarter up to 2,000 people.

There was no other option but to accept the refugees but the very proposal had to conform with the requirements of military security.

This was solved in the following manner:

- a) a Central Massing Point was set up in school buildings in RAVENSTEIN, which could accommodate up to 1,000 people,
- b) each refugee had to pass through this Centre,
- c) a control point was set up (Defence Intelligence plus Underground) on the ferry outside the town of RAVENSTEIN (the road from RAVENSTEIN to WIJCHEN), which supervised the procedures mentioned in point 'b',
- d) all other methods of crossing the river MAAS were prohibited,
- e) at the massing centre, each refugee had to be identified,
- f) if the refugee was able to prove his identity and could call upon personal contacts with anyone within the Brigade's area, he was given a document confirming registration – issued by the O.D. – on the basis of which he could move freely around the area and even find private quartering,
- g) if not, then he remained in confinement in the School,
- h) security of the Massing Point was dealt with in an exceptionally efficient fashion by members of the O.D.
- i) a temporary food centre was set up in the town of HERPEN.

Recently, the number of unidentified people amounted to only *about* 200 people.

10. Bridge Security.

Bridge security duties were provided by Defence Intelligence soldiers, the Parachute Brigade's Military Police/Gendarmerie and occasionally (by way of contact) soldiers of the F.S.S. [Field Security Section] – Grenadier Guards, and the F.S.S. of the British 3rd Division. An increased number of members of the O.D. was assigned to this duty and, during periods of increased traffic around the bridge at NIJMEGEN, a representative of the British 30th Corps's CA [Civil Affairs] was present and he issued passes allowing crossing over the bridge (*Encl. No. 28*).

Defence Intelligence's task was ~~The aim of security on the bridges~~ was to secure *the bridges* against enemy sabotage action.

The following sabotage methods were taken into account:

- a) sailing under the bridge, setting charges under the pillars and then detonating them (this is how the rail bridge in NIJMEGEN was blown up and the road bridge damaged).
- b) placing explosives in a boat or barge and letting it float under a bridge.
- c) Intermittent dropping of small amounts of explosive charges in certain specified points (weak points of the structure of the bridge) by pedestrians and then – once the amount of explosive materials was sufficient – detonating them.
- d) Causing a supposed traffic jam on the bridge by immobilising a car, meanwhile another car standing on the bridge (the bridge at NIJMEGEN is about over 100 metres in length) and filled with explosives, which are detonated.

The following regulations were issued:

- a) No-one is allowed to approach by river to a distance of less than 200 metres from [the bridge].
- b) It was suggested that the bridge be secured by mounting a net or ropes across the canal from the side where the current flows (mines, floating charges etc.).
- c) Cars had to keep a distance of 50 yards from each other.
- d) Cars were not allowed to stop on a bridge.
- e) Any car which stopped on the bridge was to be considered suspect and immediately checked.
- f) Random checking of contents of suitcases and packages, being carried across the bridge by pedestrians.
- g) Crossing the bridge prohibited during certain set hours which were stipulated on a daily basis by the 30th Corps.
- h) All traffic across the bridge prohibited (except military columns) during the night.
- i) Control of pedestrians. Thousands of people crossed the bridge at NIJMEGEN daily. This provided a very good excuse to carry out document controls.

Movement of traffic was irregular – it increased or decreased, depending on the time of day and on unexpected factors such as German bombing. Sometimes the traffic was so intensive that carrying out controls would have resulted in massive crowds of people on both sides of the bridge, waiting to cross. [Control] was then impossible because of constant bombing by the Luftwaffe and so-called “straffing” carried out by German fighter planes, and major crowding of people had to be avoided. Therefore, strict document control was carried out only during less busy hours. In some circumstances, pedestrians were guided across in small groups without any control of documents. The principle of “KEEP MOVING” was absolutely compulsory – nobody was allowed to stop when crossing the bridge.

11. Suspected persons.

Suspected persons were categorised as follows:

- a) Accused of collaboration with the Germans. These were the most numerous instances because one of the characteristic symptoms of the ending of the occupation was the enormous number of such accusations. During the very first days of the Brigade being stationed in the defence area, 17 persons were arrested by the Police, or by the O.D. All these people were interrogated by the Defence Intelligence Officer and, after confirmation that the content of the accusations was of a purely internal-Dutch nature, they were transferred to the Dutch Mission in GRAVE. Amongst the various incidences, there was not a single case with serious grounds. On the whole, the matter appeared thus: when the suspected persons confessed to collaboration with the Germans, they would add that they had to act like this because they were dependent on the Germans (for employment or economic reasons) and they would name witnesses who were often very serious and trustworthy persons and who gave the suspects excellent references. Naturally, only the Dutch themselves were able to judge and take decisions in the face of these accusations.

- b) German citizens – there were 4 instances of arrest. They related to Jews, German citizens who fled from persecution in Germany; they waited in hiding throughout the occupation and when the Allies entered, they were arrested as German citizens. In all of these cases, the suspects were freed in view of the lack of any accusations against them. It would, after all, have been unfair to punish a person for being a Jew, notwithstanding his German citizenship, and then once again for the mere reason that he was a German citizen.
- c) Inability to prove identity was the reason behind the arrest of 3 people, two of whom were freed after proving their identity, and one (a 17 year old boy who stayed hidden in forests, to avoid being sent to forced labour in Germany) was referred to the Dutch Mission in GRAVE.
- d) A typical instance of suspicion of a K.W. nature [Kontrwywiad wojskowy = military counter-intelligence] – and the only one of its kind [in this situation] – concerned a young, ostensibly Polish, woman – Miss Anna WŁODARSKA (her files in the matter were transferred to the Defence Intelligence Department, JWWB¹⁴ Command on 22nd November 1944).

WŁODARSKA, born in Poland, emigrated as a one-year old infant with her parents and lived abroad for 19 years – latterly in MAISON LAFITTE near Paris.

On the **29th September** 1944 a British military vehicle brought WŁODARSKA to the II Parachute Battalion. WŁODARSKA then declared that she was staying in NIJMEGEN and when she found out that there were Polish troops nearby, she asked one of the British officers to drive her to the Poles as she intends to volunteer and join up with the Polish Army. During interrogation by the Defence Intelligence Officer, WŁODARSKA, stated that in August 1944, the Germans had deported her for forced labour in AUGSBURG. She was transported along the route: LILLE, TOURNAI, HASSELT, MASSTRICHT, NIJMEGEN. Here WŁODARSKA escaped from the transport and turned to the first young Dutchman she met in the street, asking him to hide her until the arrival of the Allies. The Dutchman took her to his parents' home, and WŁODARSKA told them about herself and that she had escaped from the transport. She stayed with this Dutch family for 6 weeks until such time as she set off in search of the Polish Forces.

The interrogation gave rise to certain reservations, for example: her route did not lead to AUGSBURG which lies in the south of the Reich; doubtful, too, was WŁODARSKA'S escape from the transport, since WŁODARSKA had with her three suitcases; it was doubtful that the Dutch agreed so easily to hide a woman they did not know and who had escaped from the transport; WŁODARSKA was unable to explain where she had obtained the sum of approx. 10?,000¹⁵ French francs, about 260 Dutch Gulden, and certain sums in Belgian francs and German marks, although she continued to contend that she was not at all well-off; it was very obvious that WŁODARSKA spoke Polish with a strong German accent – without a trace of French influences, although she had spent all her life in France; in addition, it was very strange that, when suddenly questioned, WŁODARSKA answered in German "bitte?", and not in French, or in Polish. WŁODARSKA was detained.

The investigations carried out in NIJMEGEN revealed that WŁODARSKA stayed only 2 weeks in the home of the Dutch, whose address she had given and she had approached them the very day the Germans left NIJMEGEN; also that she had not told

¹⁴ JWWB [*Jednostka Wojska w Wielkiej Brytanii*] = (Polish) Army Unit in Great Britain

¹⁵ There is a handwritten insertion/amendment on the figure – confirmed in the margin as: 10,000

them anything of her past, that she had previously lived in NIJMEGEN in the home of another woman, which some German officer had rented for her, bidding her to take good care of WŁODARSKA; and that a German military vehicle had brought WŁODARSKA to the woman's house, that the German soldier had taken her luggage upstairs and that she related that she works in a German office and implied that she carries out some sort of very important tasks.

Confronted with the results of the investigation, WŁODARSKA changed her statements, saying she worked as a waitress in the SOLDATHEIM in MAISON LAFITTE, that she was the fiancée of a German officer with whom she set off on a trip to Belgium, that the officer was recalled to the front and she reported to the Komendantur in HASSELT and from there she was directed to NIJMEGEN, where she obtained work in the WEHRMACHTHEIM.

WŁODARSKA was taken to the Central Intelligence COLLECTING POINT of the British 30th Corps where she was recognised by one of the Dutchmen as a clerk of the GESTAPO in BRUSSELS.

WŁODARSKA'S future fate is unknown.

12. Relations with Dutch central authorities and with the F.S.P.

- a) Dutch authorities. The first official contact with a representative of the Dutch Government was the visit of the Government Representative, Baron, Major de van der SCHUEREN who arrived at Brigade Command in NEERLOON on 2nd October 1944, accompanied by British Colonel LAMBERT of the 30th Corps's S.C.A.D. and Dutch Major HOLTKAMPF.

Before his meeting with the Brigade Commander, Major de van der SCHUEREN spoke to the Brigade's Defence Intelligence Officer and informed him that he had come specifically to discuss the question of the civilian population, as the regulations which had been issued by the Brigade's Defence Intelligence Officer were so very strict and were not applied anywhere else and he fears that the civilian population may regard the Polish Brigade as an occupying force, rather than an army of liberation. When asked by the Defence Intelligence Officer whether he could give some concrete facts, Major de van der SHUEREN declared that he was unable to point to any such concrete fact. In view of this, the Defence Intelligence Officer explained the difficult conditions in which he had initially found himself and, above all, the lack of any help whatsoever on the part of the Dutch authorities – which suggested that the authorities were absolutely indifferent to the problem of adaptation of the lives of the civilian population to the conditions of war. At the same time, the Defence Intelligence Officer admonished against making generalised accusations which were not backed up by facts.

As a result of this conversation, Major de van der SHUEREN promised to assign a representative of the Dutch Government to the Parachute Brigade's region, and also a Dutch officer who would act as a liaison between the Parachute Brigade and the Dutch authorities.

At the same time, it was agreed that this representative would examine the actual conditions and that the Defence Intelligence Officer would change those regulations which were too strict for the civilian population as long as they did not clash with urgent military expediency.

On 3rd October 1944, Mr Pieter Frederick PRINSEN-GEERLIGS, delegated by Major de van der SCHUEREN, arrived in RAVENSTEIN. This delegate investigated the actual conditions and, two days later, declared that he had found everything in order, that cooperation of the Parachute Brigade's Defence Intelligence with the local Dutch authorities is very good and that, therefore, he

has no grounds for proposing any changes whatsoever, of which he informed Major de van der SCHUEREN.

On 6th October 1944, Dutch Major HOLTKAMPF reported to the Defence Intelligence Officer and, on behalf of Major de van der SCHUEREN, expressed thanks for the good attitude towards the local populace.

The Dutch Liaison Officer never turned up at the Parachute Brigade.

- b) F.S.P. Cooperation with the F.S.S. of various army units was very close and clearly imbued with mutual trust, friendliness and good will. It was quite obvious that the fact that our non-commissioned officers had attended [intelligence] courses in Matlock, meant that they had no difficulties when in mutual contact with British Security – they had a common language and a common understanding of certain circumstances and means of dealing with them.

C. CONCLUSIONS

- 1) The Defence Intelligence Service in the Polish Army is not adapted to the needs of modern warfare. Instruction 0/27 is outmoded and too generalised to constitute an adequate basis for Defence Intelligence in wartime conditions. There is a total lack of an organisation framework for the work of the Defence Intelligence Team, the importance of which in combat conditions is undoubted. There is also a need for a unit which would examine the development of Defence Intelligence in foreign armies and which would direct the work of our own Defence Intelligence. As a result, Defence Intelligence is concentrated on eradicating internal diversion and on work within our own units – without the wider ideals and horizons which – on the one hand – give soldiers of Defence Intelligence moral satisfaction, while – on the other hand – creating understanding and respect in the environment for the work of Defence Intelligence.
- 2) A thorough and basic reorganisation of Defence Intelligence is essential and it is my belief that the following principles are crucial:
 - a) Division into internal security in army units (British – Internal Security) and security in conditions of war (Security).
 - b) The head of the former is the Defence Intelligence Officer and his office staff (British – Special Branch), the head of the latter is the Defence Intelligence Team (British – F.S.A.). This division will help to remove the suspicions and prejudices from the Defence Intelligence Team which are irrevocably related to internal security and which hamper work in the field of Military Secrets Security.
 - c) Ban on Defence Intelligence dealing with matters of troop morale and concerns. This will serve to improve attitudes of commanders to Defence Intelligence.

The only sphere of interest to Defence Intelligence with regard to matters of troop morale and mind-set is reactions of the troops to political events and not to conditions of one kind or another which may occur within units. These concerns are known to Defence Intelligence and are only examined in order to prevent sabotage from outside, or from within the units.

- d) The commander appoints an Officer in each unit (battalions and their equivalents) who, upon his orders and on his behalf, and independently of his own official position, ensures that his unit is well-informed and trained in matters of Military Secret Security; he is also responsible for safeguarding Military Secrets.

- e) The Defence Intelligence Group must be permanent and full-time and generously equipped with motor vehicles. The number of **regular** staff of the Defence Intelligence Group must be sufficiently high as modern warfare presents so many different aspects that it is more likely that there will not be enough expert staff in Defence Intelligence, rather than too many. ***Just as British and American practice has proved.***
- f) This staff must be well-trained, with particular stress laid on a knowledge of foreign languages, general knowledge, familiarity with political, economic and special relationships in the countries involved. As to military knowledge requirements: knowledge of terrain (field craft), direct combat, 'double tap' shooting, mine laying and disarming mines; additionally, staff must be trained in interrogation, carrying out searches, pursuit and arrest and also motorised vehicle skills.
- g) ***A candidate for Defence Intelligence tasks should bear the following characteristics:*** honesty, a considerable sense of responsibility and conscientiousness in carrying out the responsibilities, perspicacity and initiative. The selection procedure must be very meticulous.
- h) ***Equal conditions for advancement must be ensured***, as precedence is normally given according to so-called 'line service'. An ideal solution would be the formation of an Intelligence Service Corps, similar to that in the British and American armies.

PARA. BRIG. DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Capt. K a r p i ń s k i

Circulation list:

- 1) Para. Brigade Archives
- 2) Defence Intelligence Officer Record
- 3) And 4) Defence Intelligence
Department Head, Ministry of
National Defence and Command of
Military Units in G.B.